Lost in Intensity by Humbert-Droz, Steve et al.
Special Issue – Empirical Aesthetics
Lost in Intensity: Is there an empirical solution
to the quasi-emotions debate?
Authors
Steve Humbert-Droz,a Amanda Garcia,a Vanessa
Sennwald,b Fabrice Teroni,a Julien Deonna,a David
Sander,b and Florian Covaa
aSwiss Center for Affective Sciences, and Department of Philosophy, Faculté des Lettres,
University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
bSwiss Center for Affective Sciences, and Department of Psychology, FPSE, University
of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
Abstract: Contrary to the emotions we feel in everyday contexts, the emotions we
feel for fictional characters do not seem to require a belief in the existence of their
object. This observation has given birth to a famous philosophical paradox (the
‘paradox of fiction’), and has led some philosophers to claim that the emotions we
feel for fictional characters are not genuine emotions but rather ‘quasi-emotions’.
Since then, the existence of quasi-emotions has been a hotly debated issue. Re-
cently, philosophers and psychologists have proposed to solve this debate by using
empirical methods and experimentally studying differences (especially difference
in intensity) between ‘real’ and ‘fictional’ emotions. In this paper, our goal is to
assess the success of these attempts. We begin by surveying the existing empirical
literature and stressing the methodological problems that plague most studies that
might seem relevant to the debate, before focusing on recent studies that avoid
this pitfall. We then argue that, due to conceptual problems, these studies fail to
be relevant to the philosophical debate, and emphasise new directions for future
empirical research on the topic.
One enduring debate in aesthetics bears on the nature of our emotional re-
actions towards fictional entities and events. As famously stressed by Colin
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Radford, such emotions seem to differ from ‘ordinary’ (or ‘genuine’) emotions
to the extent that they seem indifferent to the existence of their object. While
ordinary emotions seem to require some belief in the existence of their object,
emotions directed towards fictional entities seem indifferent to the absence of
such beliefs.1 Moreover, while we tend to condemn ordinary emotions that
run contrary to our beliefs – e.g. we would blame adults who are afraid of
vampires and cover their house in garlic – we have no such qualms about emo-
tions directed towards fictional entities – e.g. it is okay to be afraid of Dracula
while watching a movie. These observations have led some philosophers to
argue that emotions directed towards fictional entities are not ‘genuine’ emo-
tions, in the sense that they constitute a distinct class of affective phenomena,
which some have dubbed ‘quasi-emotions’.
Recently, in the rise of what has come to be known as ‘experimental phi-
losophy of aesthetics’, some philosophers and psychologists have proposed to
address these questions using experimental methods.2 In this paper, our goal
is to assess what has been achieved so far by empirical studies on emotional
reactions towards fictional entities, how they relate to the philosophical de-
bate on quasi-emotions, and how empirical approaches to this problem could
be improved upon in the future.
In §1, we present the so-called ‘paradox of fiction’ and how it motivated
Kendall Walton to introduce the notion of ‘quasi-emotions’.3 In §§2 and 3,
we survey the existing empirical studies on the effect of the real/fictional
distinction on emotional reactions and explore what empirical lessons we can
draw from them. In §2, we highlight some methodological limitations of
existing studies while, in §3, we present the results of two new studies and
argue that it is still too early to draw conclusions about the impact of the
real/fictional distinction on emotional responses. In §§4 and 5, we discuss the
prospects of empirically solving the debate on quasi-emotions. In §4, we argue
that the existing studies are mostly irrelevant to the current debate while, in
§5, we try to imagine what a relevant empirical test of quasi-emotions theories
could look like.
I. QUASI-EMOTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE PARADOX OF FICTION
The contemporary debate on the nature of our emotional reactions towards
fictional entities started when Radford made the following observation: in
everyday life, realising that the object of my emotions does not really exist
generally makes this emotion disappear. Suppose Maria is terrified because
she believes that a huge asteroid is going to collide the Earth. Learning that
the asteroid is a hoax will make her fear disappear. Observations of this kind,
which can easily be multiplied, motivate the following principle: we can only
feel emotions towards entities we believe to exist. However, this seemingly
trivial principle faces an equally trivial counter-example: we regularly feel
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emotions towards entities we know not to exist, such as characters in novels
or movies. Philosophers have taken the habit to express this ‘paradox’ in the
form of the following trilemma:
1) We have [genuine] emotions concerning the situations of fic-
tional characters.
2) To have [genuine] emotions concerning someone’s situation we
must believe the proposition that describes that situation.
3) We do not believe the propositions that describe the situations
of fictional characters.4
These three propositions cannot be all true at the same time. Thus, we
should reject (at least) one of them.
Nowadays, many philosophers consider this trilemma to be an old-fashioned
and uninteresting way of presenting the paradox as most, if not all, emotions
theorists reject the second proposition.5 However, it has been argued that,
even if the trilemma presentation can be easily discarded, this does not mean
that there was no original puzzle to begin with.6 In fact, one can identify
two different puzzles hidden under the trilemma presentation.7 The first is a
metaphysical (or a descriptive) puzzle and can be formulated in the following
way: how is it that the emotions we feel towards fictional characters are not
as sensitive to the existence of their object as ‘genuine’ emotions directed
towards real persons? This question suggests that the psychological mecha-
nisms underlying emotions towards fictional characters are different enough
from those underlying ‘genuine’ emotions to warrant further investigation: do
they imply a kind of cognitive imagination, beliefs that p is the case ‘in the
fiction’, a suspension of (dis)belief, etc.? The second puzzle, which is closer to
Radford’s original question, bears on a normative claim about the rationality
of our emotions toward fictions.8
In this paper, we will focus only on the metaphysical puzzle and espe-
cially on one particular solution: accepting that we do not feel genuine emo-
tions toward fictional characters – i.e. the rejection of (1) in the old-fashioned
trilemma.
At first sight, this solution may seem preposterous: to most of us, it is
clear that we feel something for fictional characters when we read novels or
watch movies. It’s not like we were faking it or pretending to have emotions.
However, philosophers who reject the first statement do not deny that we feel
something, they just argue that this ‘something’ is very different from what we
feel for real objects. For example, Kendall Walton, who popularised this idea,
did not deny that we often experience some muscle tension, clutches, pulse
acceleration, and adrenalin flows while watching a horror movie. His claim
was simply that these states do not qualify as genuine fear, but should rather
be described as ‘quasi-fear’.9 This account is both famous and controversial
in aesthetics and philosophy of mind, as it seems to reject common sense
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to introduce a new category of mental states: ‘quasi-emotions’, which are
supposed to be ontologically distinct from ‘genuine’ emotions.
I.a Quasi-emotions
It is important to distinguish two different ways of conceiving quasi-emotions
in the philosophical literature:
(1) Waltonian quasi-emotions: According to the first view, defended by
Walton, we genuinely experience muscle tension, pulse acceleration and gut
feelings when we take part in a game of make-believe – which includes, for
Walton, our engagement with fictions such as novel, movies, etc. These ex-
periences are not entirely in our control, just as regular emotions, and consti-
tute what Walton call ‘quasi-emotions’.10 Nonetheless, we use these feelings
as props to propositionally imagine that we are afraid of a monster or sad for
the death of Anna Karenina – just as we use images of a movie as a prop to
feed up our game of make-believe that there is a monster.11
Gregory Currie, for his part, also defends the existence of quasi-emotions,
but insists that the main difference between emotions and quasi-emotions
concerns their grounding. The experience of a genuine emotion is grounded
on beliefs and desires, whereas the experience of quasi-emotions is grounded
on exercises of propositional imagination and desires (or imaginative desires):
In general, for any emotional state characterisable in terms of
beliefs and desires of certain kinds causing feelings of a certain
kind, there will be a corresponding quasi-emotion in which make-
belief takes over from belief.12
This parallel between structures explains the similarities as well as the
differences between emotions and quasi-emotions. Make-belief in Currie’s
view is not an operator for a complex activity but a kind of psychological
mode.13 Thus, the relation between the content of a fiction and a quasi-
emotion is more direct than in Walton’s view: the spectator is directly quasi-
afraid of Dracula, she need not, in addition, imagine being afraid.14
Currie is nevertheless more cautious than Walton regarding the claim that
quasi-emotions are ontologically distinct from emotions. He indicates that
quasi-emotions can be understood as a kind of emotions;15 and in Recreative
Minds, he seems to have abandoned the term ‘quasi-emotion’.16
(2) Meinongian quasi-emotions: Quasi-emotions can alternatively come
in another flavour. Following Alexius Meinong, Kevin Mulligan argues that
when we do more than merely judging or entertaining a thought about an
emotion and experience what it is like to feel it, we can call this phenomenon a
‘quasi-emotion’.17 For instance, we can simply remember that we were angry,
or re-experience the phenomenology of our past episode of anger. In this
second case, we would not say that we are angry, just like we would not say
that we see an apple when we imagine it visually. Imagining being angry (or
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imagining what is it like to be angry) is, thus, a sub-species of perceptual
imagination.
Mulligan doesn’t explicitly relate this phenomenon to the paradox of fic-
tion, but Fabian Dorsch goes further in arguing that quasi-emotions so under-
stood can solve the paradox of fiction.18 According to Dorsch, to experience
something akin to sadness in reading Anna Karenina, we just need to imagine
the phenomenal experience of being sad and ascribe it to the death of Anna.19
A major distinction between the Waltonian and the Meinongian account
is that the first is about the nature of emotions, the second about the nature
of imagination. According to Walton, quasi-emotions are neither imagination
nor emotion: they are physiological responses used in games of make-believe.20
Similarly, for Currie, quasi-emotions are or are not sub-species of emotions
triggered by an exercise of imagination. As opposed to this, on the Meinon-
gian account, quasi-emotions are kinds of perceptual (objectual) imagination.
Keeping this distinction in mind will prove important when it comes to assess
the relevance of empirical studies to the debate surrounding quasi-emotions.
I.b Rejecting quasi-emotions on empirical grounds?
So, what are the reasons to think that what we feel for fictional characters and
entities should be considered ‘quasi-emotions’ rather than ‘genuine’ emotions?
One main argument put forward by proponents of quasi-emotions is that
there are striking differences between ‘genuine’ emotions and the ones we feel
for fictional characters. First, what we feel for fictional characters does not
seem to trigger the same kind of behaviour as everyday emotions: even if we
report being afraid in front of a movie, we would not feel the need to flee the
cinema.21 Similarly, when a father pretends to be a monster, his child could
fly away but the smile of enjoyment that we can read on his face indicates
that his fear is not fully serious.22
Another piece of evidence in favour of quasi-emotions concerns the dura-
tion of what we feel for fictional characters. People can be deeply affected by
the death of Anna while in the process of reading Anna Karenina, but this
feeling won’t continue to haunt them very long once the book is closed. By
contrast, the death of existing people can have a lasting and continuous im-
pact on our emotional condition.23 On this basis, someone may be tempted to
add that what we feel for fictional characters is typically less intense, or less
vivid than genuine emotions. This lack of intensity constitutes, then, another
argument in favour of quasi-emotions.24 Thus, ultimately, the debate about
the existence of quasi-emotions can be reformulated in the following way: are
there differences between emotional responses towards fictional entities and
emotional responses towards real entities, and are these differences important
enough to warrant considering them as two different types of mental states?
To some, this question may appear as an empirical rather than a con-
ceptual one. Facts about the nature, intensity and motivating power of psy-
chological states are the standard object of psychological inquiry, and not
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something that can be assessed using a priori methods. As such, it makes
sense to consider that the existence of significant differences between every-
day emotions and the emotions we feel for fictional characters should be the
object of an empirical inquiry. This is why some philosophers have turned to
experimental methods in the hope of making progress on the ‘quasi-emotions’
problem.
So far, these studies have mainly focused on differences in intensity be-
tween ‘real’ emotions (the object of which is considered to be real) and ‘fic-
tional’ emotions (the object of which is considered fictional). In one crucial
study, Sperduti et al. failed to detect any physiological difference between
real and fictional emotions.25 This lack of difference leads them to conclude
that ‘the fiction-directed emotions are physically robust [. . . ] and can be seen
as genuine emotions. The answer to the paradox of fiction should probably
be sought not in emotion per se, but in factors and mechanisms modulating
it’.26 However, discussing the results of the very same study, Jérôme Pelletier
concludes that these data constitute ‘an incentive for labelling our affective
responses to fictions quasi-emotions’.27
This disagreement highlights the difficulty of using empirical data to di-
rectly ‘solve’ the debate about quasi-emotions. While we are in sympathy
with the idea that empirical experiments can clarify and support (or contra-
dict) common-sense intuitions, we will argue that, as far as quasi-emotions
are concerned, the current empirical experiments are not sufficient to settle
the debate even though they provide us with new tracks for more fine-grained
experimental designs and for novel solutions to other related puzzles. This is
why, in this paper, our aim will be to survey the existing empirical literature
before assessing its relevance to the philosophical debate on the existence of
quasi-emotions.
II. WHAT DO THE EXPERIMENTS ACTUALLY SHOW?
METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN
THE STUDY OF ‘FICTIONAL’ EMOTIONS
As mentioned, going through the literature, one can find a handful of studies
purporting to explore differences in emotional reactions to ‘real’ and ‘fictional’
stimuli – either because they are directly interested in this difference, or be-
cause they use it as a means to study another phenomenon, such as emotion
regulation. All of these studies focus on the effect of the real/fictional distinc-
tion on the (phenomenal or physiological) intensity of emotional responses:
the question is whether perceiving a stimulus as fictional (rather than real)
will modulate the intensity of emotional responses.28 On a first approach, one
might think that all these studies are relevant to an empirical approach to
the quasi-emotions problem. However, it turns out that very few of them are




II.a Problem 1: faulty conceptualisation of what counts as
fictional
Some studies fall short simply because their operationalisation of what counts
as fictional is faulty. For example, Thalia Goldstein showed participants
excerpts of popular fictional movies (e.g., Love Story) and either told them
that the director or screenwriter based the plot on their personal experiences
(reality), or that they had entirely made up the plot of the film (fiction).29 As
a result, Goldstein found no difference between ‘real’ and ‘fictional’ stimuli.30
However, this approach is clearly problematic as the fact that movies are
based on real events does not prevent them from being fictions and being
considered as depicting fictional events. Sam knows that Lawrence of Arabia
is a biopic based on real events, but he does not believe that he is watching the
historical Lawrence. Rather, a good ‘real’ condition should show participants
movies presented as documentaries, clearly aiming at depicting real events –
rather than based on real events.
Moreover, popular (American) movies contain cinematographic conven-
tions such as soundtrack, lighting, traveling, etc. These conventions tamper
the results: even if participants were informed that these movies depict real
events, the way they are filmed makes them immediately identifiable as fic-
tion.
II.b Problem 2: contents not matched across conditions
A second issue arises when studies do not present the same kind of content
across conditions (what is ‘real’ and ‘fictional’). Indeed, to know whether
the sole fact of appraising a narrative as real or fictional is enough to change
emotional intensity, it is important to rule out changes that might be due to
differences in content. For example, LaMarre and Landreville found that par-
ticipants were more likely to feel guilt, regret and shame about the Rwandan
genocide when they were presented with a documentary about the genocide
compared to a historical reconstruction of this same genocide.31 However, the
effect they observed might have nothing to do with the real/fictional distinc-
tion, and only with the content of each stimulus. There are, indeed, relevant
aesthetical differences between documentaries and reconstitutions – starting
with music, acting, editing, lighting, etc.
The same problem arises for Pouliot and Cowen’s study purportedly show-
ing the exact opposite, i.e. that fictions actually elicit more intense emotional
reactions than documentaries: the stimuli presented in the ‘documentary’ and
in the ‘fiction’ conditions were completely different.32 However, determining
the role of appraising a content as ‘real’ or ‘fictional’ requires the very same
content to be presented as real (in one condition) and fictional (in the other
condition).
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II.c Problem 3: instructions encouraging content
reinterpretation rather than mode change
This leads us to our third problem: the way the difference between the two
conditions is presented. Most studies contrasting ‘real’ with ‘fictional’ stim-
uli have been primarily interested in the study of cognitive reappraisal as
a regulation strategy for emotional reactions, and not in the impact of the
real/fictional distinction per se.33 Typically, in those studies, a given stimu-
lus is first presented to participants as depicting a real event, and then, in a
second stage, participants are asked to reappraise it as depicting a fictional
event. The results of these studies lend support to the idea that affective
reactions to real stimuli and affective reactions to fictional stimuli can be dis-
tinguished: participants who were instructed to reappraise a given stimuli as
fictional tended to have less intense affective reactions than those instructed
to interpret the stimuli as real.
Though adequate to study the effect of cognitive reappraisal on emotions
(which was the actual aim), the method employed in this study as well as
numerous others may not deliver the kind of evidence defendants of quasi-
emotions need. Indeed, their philosophical relevance is diminished by the
instruction participants are given to reappraise the stimulus as fictional. In
most cases, participants are instructed to reinterpret the stimulus not as a
fictional depiction of a given scene, but as a real depiction of people pretend-
ing to be in a certain situation. For example, Oliveira and her colleagues
presented participants with pictures of mutilated bodies.34 In one condition
(the real condition), participants first read a text about worldwide violence
and were then instructed to keep in mind that these images represented ‘real
scenes’.35 In the other condition (the ‘fictional condition’), participants first
read a text about the wonderful makeup tricks used to simulate injuries in
films and were then instructed to always have in mind that these were ‘cinema
makeup productions’, even if they looked ‘very real’ (ibid). Now, given the
framing of the task, it is not clear that people in both conditions appraised
the same content (a mutilated body) and only differed to the extent that they
represented it as real or fictional. Rather, participants may have appraised
two different contents represented as real: a real depiction of a mutilated
body in the ‘real’ condition, and a real depiction of an actor pretending to
be mutilated in the ‘fictional’ condition. If this is the case, then these studies
only tell philosophers about the (trivial) fact that different contents will elicit
different emotional reactions, but have nothing to say about the emotional
impact of representing the same content as fictional opposed to real.36
In fact, these studies correspond more closely to Radford’s original case
– in which we learn that something we believe to be the case is actually a
hoax – than to the way we generally engage with fictions.37 A more adequate
operationalisation of the real/fictional distinction should direct participants
attention towards the difference in mode (a real report vs. a fictional narra-
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tive) rather than towards the fact that objects in the fictional narratives are
not in fact what they seem to be – which encourages content reappraisal.
II.d Sperduti et al. experiment
We just highlighted three methodological limitations that render most of the
studies about the effect of the real/fictional distinction on emotional reactions
irrelevant to the question of quasi-emotions.38
In their study, Sperduti et al. presented participants with brief video clips
(around 4-5 seconds, no sound) that were preceded by a ‘REAL’ or ‘FIC-
TIONAL’ cue. Thus, across participants, the very same clips could be pre-
sented as ‘REAL’ or ‘FICTIONAL’, which fulfils the requirement for keeping
content constant across condition. Moreover, during the instruction phase,
the ‘REAL’ and ‘FICTIONAL’ labels were explained as follows: ‘REAL’ video
clips were presented as excerpts of documentaries or amateur videos, while
‘FICTIONAL’ video clips were presented as excerpts from ‘mockumentaries’
(fictions shot in the same style as a documentary). Here again, the method
avoids the pitfall of inviting participants to see the ‘fictional’ stimuli as ‘real’
representation of different objects – e.g. by saying that the persons in fic-
tional videos are actors. The instructions are minimal and only emphasise
the fictional nature of these representations.
Video clips were either (i) neutral, (ii) positive, or (iii) negative. Sperduti
et al. (2016) observed that, for negative videos (but not for positive and neu-
tral ones), presenting them as fictional led participants to report less intense
emotional reactions, suggesting that appraising the same contents as real or
fictional is enough to make a difference in the intensity of emotional reac-
tions.39 However, participants electrodermal activity was not significantly
affected by the real/fictional distinction.
Sperduti et al. results are hard to interpret. On the one hand, the dif-
ference they observe in negative emotions reports seems to provide evidence
in favour of a difference between emotions directed towards fictional entities
and emotions directed towards real entities, the former being on average less
intense than the latter – at least when it comes to negative emotions.40
Still, the fact that the difference was only observed for subjective reports
and not for physiological measures leads Sperduti et al. to reach a conclu-
sion that is reflected in the title of their paper (i.e. The paradox of fiction:
Emotional response toward fiction. . . ):
Regarding the philosophical debate about the nature of emotion
toward fiction our data seem to suggest that the fiction-directed
emotions are physically robust, as witnessed by a physiological
arousal comparable to real material, and can be seen as genuine
emotions.41
One might think that Sperduti et al. are too quick in reaching this conclu-
sion. After all, their study simply fails to observe a significant effect and there
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is no easy step from this to the conclusion that there is a lack of effect. Given
the existence of what statisticians call ‘type-II errors’ or ‘false negatives’, a
reasonable inference from a null effect to an absence of effect would require
several studies failing to observe a significant effect. But, as we will see, not
all studies fail to observe such an effect.
III. CONFLICTING RESULTS: TWO OTHER STUDIES ON
THE IMPACT OF THE REAL/FICTIONAL DISTINCTION
ON EMOTIONAL REACTIONS
Coincidentally, at the same time Sperduti et al. were running their study, we
were also running two very similar ones.42 Though the results of our own
studies agree with Sperduti et al. data on many points, there are also impor-
tant differences that directly bear on their interpretation of their results.43
Despite wide similarities in design, one key difference between Sperduti
et al.’s study and our own lies in the kind of stimuli we used. One possible
reason for the absence of (significant) difference in physiological responses in
Sperduti et al.’s study might simply be that their stimuli were too short and
minimal (4 to 5 seconds, no sound, only image), and thus differed in deep
and important ways from typical fictions, which give at least some time for
audiences to immerse themselves in the story. By contrast, our studies used
fewer but longer stimuli: (i) video clips that were about five minutes long,
and (ii) texts that were about one page long.
Both video clips and texts were matched for content, as we wrote texts
ourselves to match the content of video clips. Video clips were mostly excerpts
from documentaries and amateur videos. Some were chosen to be neutral –
e.g. people picking mushrooms, or playing chess – while others were chosen
to be sad – e.g. people tending to their paralysed father, or soldiers talking
about their experience in Iraq. While previous studies on the same topic have
only used images or videos, we thought the introduction of texts would lead
to a methodological improvement, for it is harder to reinterpret a fictional
text in such way as to perceive it as a real representation of something else.
Indeed, while someone watching a movie can always end up perceiving actors
playing a role rather than the characters themselves – particularly when the
actors are not convincing – it is hard to imagine a similar phenomenon in the
case of texts. We thus thought that using texts in addition to videos would
give one additional way of avoiding the problem of participants reinterpreting
stimuli.
Despite this difference in stimuli, our operationalisation of the real/fictional
distinction was very close to the one used by Sperduti et al. Video clips were
presented as part of documentaries or amateur videos (in the ‘real’ condition)
or as part of mockumentaries (in the ‘fiction’ condition). As for the texts,
they were described as news articles (in the ‘real’ condition) or as fictions
under the form of news articles (in the ‘fictional’ condition).
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III.a Summary of our first study
Our first study was purely correlational. We presented 46 participants (all
women) with either videos (N = 27) or texts (N = 19), and told them that
some stimuli would be ‘real’ while others would be ‘fictional’, but did not
specify which ones were fictional or which ones were real. Rather, partici-
pants had to report their own perception of the reality/fictionality of each
stimulus after seeing it. They were also asked to rate their negative feel-
ings (including sadness) at the end of each stimulus. This allowed to look at
whether participants’ beliefs in their reality or fictionality would predict the
intensity of participants’ emotional reactions.
This first experiment also served as preparation for the second experiment
as it allowed us to identify the ‘saddest’ part of each stimulus, for which we
would register and analyse physiological reactions. Indeed, participants were
asked to highlight the saddest parts of each stimulus – by pressing a key in the
video condition, or literally highlighting the relevant passage with markers in
the text condition.
Inferential tests run on participants sadness reports showed that our ‘sad’
stimuli (contrary to our ‘neutral’ stimuli) were indeed successful in inducing
sadness. Because videos and texts did not differ in their ability to induce
sadness, and videos were not perceived as more fictional than texts, all stimuli
were lumped together for subsequent analyses. Focusing on sad stimuli, we
tested for a correlation between participants’ sadness reports (how sad they
felt) and their fictionality reports – to which extent they considered the stimuli
to be fictional. As predicted, a significant negative correlation was revealed
(r = -.337), reflecting that the more participants tended to perceive items as
real, the more they reported feeling sad.
To put it otherwise: participants tended to report less sadness after film
clips and texts they believed to be fictional, compared to film clips and texts
they believed to be real. Because there were no instructions from the ex-
perimenters part to reappraise the stimuli in a way that would change the
content of participants experience, these results lend support to the thesis
that perceiving a stimulus as fictional triggers less intense emotions, at least
for sad stimuli. However, because our results in this first study were only
correlational, there was a possibility that the causal relationship between our
two variables ran in the opposite direction: that experiencing more intense
emotions led participants to consider the stimuli as more real and less fic-
tional. To correct for this shortcoming, we directly manipulated participants
perception of the stimuli as real or fictional in our second study.
III.b Summary of our second study
Our second study was thus experimental, meaning that we directly manipu-
lated participants perception of stimuli as ‘real’ or ‘fictional’ before observing
the impact of this manipulation on participants’ emotional reactions. To do
so, we specified prior to the presentation of each stimulus whether this stimu-
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lus was ‘real’ or ‘fictional’. For both kinds of stimuli, multiple components of
the emotional response were measured: the subjective experience (reported
through scales), the physiological responses (heart rate, frequency of skin
conductance) and motor expressions (corrugator activity).
For participants subjective reports, our analysis revealed a significant in-
teraction between valence (whether stimuli were ‘neutral’ or ‘sad’) and con-
text (whether stimuli were presented as ‘real’ or ‘fictional’). More specifically,
participants reported more sadness when the ‘sad’ stimuli were presented as
real compared to fictional, which was not the case for the ‘neutral’ stimuli.
Thus, presenting the very same stimuli (videos or texts) as ‘fictional’ rather
than ‘real’ led participants to report lower levels of sadness. Moreover, this
result extended to reports of negative affect in general.
But was this difference in subjective reports reflected in participants phys-
iological responses? While we failed to find a significant effect of context, or a
significant interaction between valence and context for measures of heart rate
and corrugator activity, the analysis performed on skin conductance responses
revealed a significant interaction between context and valence. This prompted
us to directly test our hypothesis and to separately compare responses to ‘real’
and ‘fictional’ stimuli for the ‘neutral’ and ‘sad’ stimuli. In the case of video
clips, we found a significant difference in skin conductance responses between
the sad film clips presented as real and those presented as fictional. There
was no such difference in the case of neutral film clips. More specifically,
participants had significantly less skin conductance responses when viewing
the sad movies presented as real compared to the sad movies presented as
fictional, which is coherent with them reporting less sadness when movies are
presented as fictional – lower skin conductance responses being a marker of
more intense sadness.44
III.c Discussion of our studies
Overall, our studies confirm and replicate Sperduti et al.’s results when it
comes to participants subjective reports. Our first study shows that the
more participants perceive sad stimuli (videos or text) as fictional, the less
sadness and negative affect they report. Moreover, our second study shows
that merely presenting a stimulus as ‘fictional’, compared to ‘real’, is enough
for participants to report lesser sadness and negative affects.
Still, despite these effects, Sperduti et al. nevertheless concluded that there
was no fundamental difference between emotions elicited by real narratives
and emotions elicited by fictions, based on the fact that they did not observe
a significant effect of their manipulation on physiological measures. However,
in our second study, we found a significant effect of our manipulation on phys-
iological responses: for sad videos, skin conductances frequency was higher
when videos were presented as fictional. Of course, this might be a case of
false positive – after all, we tested for three different physiological measures
and found a significant effect for only one of them. Still, these results suggest
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that it is premature to conclude that the real/fictional distinction has no ef-
fect on participants physiological reactions and thus even more premature to
conclude on this basis that quasi-emotions are genuine emotions
IV. INTERPRETING THE RESULTS: WHAT
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE?
What are the theoretical implications of these different results for the philo-
sophical debate on the existence of quasi-emotions?
IV.a Implications for Waltonian quasi-emotions
As we have seen, Sperduti et al. conclude that their data plead against quasi-
emotions. The argument that implicitly underlies their conclusion parallels
Noël Carroll’s objection to Walton’s theory:
But then how can we be saddened by the plight of Amos Barton,
when we know that Amos Barton is fictional? Or must we give
up the idea that we are saddened by Barton? Yet this seems
counter-intuitive, given the intensity of our feelings.45
Both rejections of quasi-emotions rely on the same implicit argument, which
can be summed up as follows:
(a) Philosophical accounts of quasi-emotions imply the existence
of a phenomenal/physiological difference in intensity between gen-
uine emotions and quasi-emotions.
(b) If there is no phenomenal/physiological difference in intensity
between ‘real’ emotions and ‘fictional’ emotions, then it is more
reasonable to think that ‘fictional’ emotions are genuine emotions
rather than quasi-emotions.
(c) There is no relevant phenomenal/physiological difference in
intensity between ‘real’ emotions and ‘fictional’ emotions.
(d) So, it is more reasonable to think that ‘fictional’ emotions are
genuine emotions, rather than quasi-emotions.
Premise (c) is the empirical one: as we saw, the dearth of existing evidence
and the presence of conflicting results make it difficult to consider this premise
as empirically established. But what if it were? Would we be warranted in
accepting conclusion (d)? Not necessarily, as premise (a) is also problematic.
Indeed, according to Walton himself, there is no reason to think that quasi-
emotions are necessarily less intense (phenomenologically or physiologically)
than genuine emotions. Responding to Carroll’s presentation, he writes:
The intensity of one’s feelings is no reason to insist that the correct
description of one’s experience has to be that of (literally) being
saddened.46
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Currie, for his part, argues that feelings elicited by belief and by imagina-
tion may be phenomenologically similar.47 Moreover, both Currie and Walton
consider that emotions and quasi-emotions can occur without phenomenol-
ogy.48 So, according to the very advocates of quasi-emotions, phenomenology
(and presumably its associated physiology) cannot be used as a criterion to
distinguish between genuine emotions and quasi-emotions. As a consequence,
under a Waltonian conception of quasi-emotions, even if there was no observ-
able difference in intensity between ‘real’ and ‘fictional’ emotions, we would
not be warranted to conclude that there are no such things as quasi-emotions.
IV.b Implications for Meinongian quasi-emotions
However, as we saw earlier, the Waltonian conception of quasi-emotions is not
the only one. On the alternative Meinongian conception of quasi-emotions
(thereafter ‘M quasi-emotions’), according to which they are exercises of ob-
jectual/perceptual imagination, it seems that phenomenology (and its asso-
ciated physiology) cannot be considered so easily as being orthogonal to our
enjoyment of fictions. Regarding perceptual imagination, David Hume makes
the following observation:
[Memory and imagination] may mimic or copy the perception of
the sense; but they never can entirely reach the force and vivacity
of the original sentiment.49
This well-known principle states that, since imagination is a re-creation
of a primary mental state, it cannot be as vivid as this primary state. Or,
as emphasised by Mulligan, a simulation shares some, but not all features of
the mental state it re-creates.50
We suspect that Sperduti et al.’s attack on quasi-emotions relies precisely
on such a principle. In a nutshell, if quasi-emotions are sub-species of imag-
ination and if there is (at least) no physiological difference between quasi-
emotions and regular emotions, then advocates of quasi-emotions face the
following dilemma: rejecting Humes principle or rejecting quasi-emotions.
One could argue that vividness is a fuzzy notion so that we cannot know
if Humes use of ‘vividness’ in his Enquiry really refers to phenomenologi-
cal/physiological vividness.51 For instance, Dorsch considers the lack of ac-
tion tendencies in quasi-emotions as a sign of low vividness.52 In our opinion,
this solution is contrived, considering that to imagine having an emotion is
a kind of re-creation of perception, just like a visual mental image. These
mental images are known to lack determinacy or to be occlusive, which are
obvious phenomenal properties. If quasi-emotions are perception-like, it is
likely that they resemble their siblings in the same way.
Thus, it seems that it makes sense to predict that M quasi-emotions will
(on average) be less intense than genuine emotions. Does this mean that the
results we have surveyed so far are relevant to the debate on the existence
of M quasi-emotions – i.e. that Sperduti et al. results warrant rejecting the
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existence of quasi-emotions understood in this way, while our results warrant
accepting their existence?
Actually, this is not clear. Indeed, the results we have surveyed so far bear
on (potential) differences in intensity between real and fictional emotions. The
question is thus whether the results of these studies tells us something about
M quasi-emotions. Let us suppose that, for the reason we just presented, M
quasi-emotions are on average less intense than genuine emotions. Showing
that there is no difference between genuine emotions and fictional emotions
would indeed be a good reason to conclude that fictional emotions are not
M quasi-emotions. But this would not be a good reason to conclude that M
quasi-emotions do not exist. Indeed, in contrast to Waltonian quasi-emotions,
Meinongian quasi-emotions are not conceptually tied to fiction (make-believe)
or engagement with fiction: they may exist, despite playing no key role in
our engagement with fiction – pace Fabian Dorsch.
Moreover, showing that there is a difference in intensity between real and
fictional emotions (as we think we did) would not be enough to conclude
that fictional emotions are M quasi-emotions. Indeed, there are good reasons
to doubt that M quasi-emotions can capture our affective engagement with
fictions.
In being caught up by a fiction, we do not seem to be able to decide
to not feel an imaginative emotion toward the content of the fiction or to
feel the phenomenology of happiness in front of a sad content.53 Rather,
‘the most plausible claim is that imagining experiencing an unjust situation,
rather than imagining experiencing indignation, gives rise to [our] (genuine
or quasi-) indignation’.54 Thence, even if emotions for fictions seem, in our
studies, phenomenologically and physiologically less vivid than emotions for
real events all things considered, we still think that this is not an argument
in favour of M quasi-emotions.
IV.c Debating a truism in Aesthetics
Thus, it is not clear that empirical results about potential intensity differences
between real and fictional emotions have much bearing on the philosophical
debate on the existence of quasi-emotions – at best, they show that fictional
emotions are not Meinongian quasi-emotions. But this does not mean that
these studies should be discarded. Indeed, whether there is (on average) a
difference in intensity between genuine and fictional emotions is a fascinating
debate in itself. Contrary to Sperduti et al. hypothesis that emotions for
fictions are less intense than emotions for real events, many aestheticians
consider the rejection of this idea as a truism:55
It is false, however, to suggest that there are systematic differences
[. . . ] between ordinary emotions and emotions directed to fictions.
Emotions can vary greatly in their intensity.56
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The difference between the feelings I experience in responding to a
fictional character or situation and those I experience in response
to what I take to be actual cannot simply be understood in terms
of intensity. What I feel for or about a fictional character may in
fact be more intense than my feelings for or about the starving
Ethiopians, or the Guatemalan refugees whose plight I hear about
on radio or television.57
For example, an anonymous referee for this manuscript pointed out that
sometimes the death of a character can affect us more than the death of a
real person. As Oscar Wilde once wrote ‘One of the greatest tragedies of my
life is the death of Lucien de Rubempré. It is a grief from which I have never
been able completely to rid myself.’58
By focusing on this kind of example, aestheticians presumably want to
capture the following truism:
(A) Emotions towards character/event known to be fictional can
in some circumstances be equally intense as emotions towards
people/events known to be non-fictional.
This variability in the intensity of our emotions towards fictional entities
seems to be the reason why Currie, Walton, Carroll and even Dorsch consider
that quasi-emotions may be similar in intensity to regular emotions, and why
some philosophers consider the paradox of fiction to be intractable.59
However, one can accept that we can find some episodes of fictional emo-
tions that are as intense (or even more intense) than some episodes of real
emotions, but still endorse the following claim:
(B) Emotions toward characters/events known to be fictional are
ceteris paribus less intense than emotions towards people/events
known to be non-fictional.60
Is it the case? This is the question that the studies we have surveyed
in sections 2 and 3 have addressed, and our own results suggest that, at
least for negative, low intensity emotions, there is an intensity gap between
emotions for fiction and regular emotions. With more studies, especially on
more intense emotions, we could reach a clearer verdict on this (apparent)
truism in aesthetics, which constitutes an interesting issue in itself.
V. CAN THE QUASI-EMOTIONS DEBATE BE
EMPIRICALLY ADDRESSED?
As we just showed, studying differences in intensity between real and fictional
emotions is not likely to help us determine whether fictional emotions are
genuine emotions. But can we imagine a way to empirically test whether




V.a A key difference between genuine and quasi-emotions:
action tendencies
If intensity is not the right criterion to distinguish genuine emotion from quasi-
emotions, then what is? According to proponents of quasi-emotions, one key
difference between genuine and quasi-emotions is their action tendencies.61 As
mentioned earlier, when a child flees his dad who pretends to be a monster, he
is not afraid or even half afraid: the idea is that, if it were the case, ‘we would
expect him to have some inclination to act on his fear in the normal ways’.62
But we don’t expect the child to call the police or to run away for good.63
Choosing action tendency as a criterion to distinguish between emotions and
quasi-emotions makes sense, since many scholars consider action tendencies
as a central feature of emotions.64
Thus, to come back to Waltons original example of a spectator watching
a movie, the intensity of this spectator’s feelings is irrelevant to determine
whether what he is feeling ‘genuine’ or ‘quasi’-fear: even if ‘his muscles are
tensed, he clutches his chair, his pulse quickens, his adrenaline flows’ , as long
as he does not have the tendency to flee the cinema or to attack the monster,
we should not call these feelings ‘fear’.65 Why? Because genuine fear leads us
to protect ourselves in running away or in dealing with danger.66
V.b Methodological issues in the comparison of action tendencies
If differences in action tendencies constitute a key distinction between genuine
and quasi-emotions, it seems that a good way of empirically testing the claim
that fictional emotions are quasi-emotions would be to test whether there
are differences in action tendencies (or motivational power) between real and
fictional emotions.
However, although the idea is simple, its execution faces considerable dif-
ficulties. A first difficulty is that it is not enough to observe differences in
motivational power between emotions we feel towards real people and emo-
tions we feel towards fictional characters to conclude that fictional emotions
are mere quasi-emotions that lack motivational power precisely because they
are not genuine emotions. Indeed, there can be alternative explanations to
the apparent lack of motivational power of fictional emotions.
A first alternative explanation is that the lack of motivating power is
not explained by a distinction between ‘real‘ and ‘fictional’ emotions, but
by a distinction between ‘direct‘ and ‘representational’ emotions, i.e. between
emotions that are elicited by a direct interaction with their object, in contrast
to emotions that are elicited by a representation of this object.67 For example,
Sam’s reaction to watching a documentary on an ongoing war probably won’t
be the same as his reaction to being actually part of that war. It would make
sense to flee in the latter case, but not in the former. However, both are
‘real’ emotions in the sense that, in both cases, Sam believes the object of her
emotion to be real. Hence, in this case, the motivational difference between
the two emotions has nothing to do with the real/fictional distinction (and
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thus with one emotion being less genuine than the other): it is a matter of
directly interacting with the object of our emotion vs. only interacting with
a representation.
Of course, it is possible to exclude this kind of confounding factor by
comparing real representation with fictional representation, which is exactly
what the studies we surveyed have been doing. However, studies on this
model would not be able to rule out a second alternative explanation: the
impossibility to act on one’s motivation. Indeed, seeing someone suffer typ-
ically elicits sympathy or compassion, which will translate in a motivation
to help this person. But for this motivation to translate into behaviour (or
even maybe to arise), we need to have some ability to help said person. If
Maria reads about the sufferings of a real person who died a long time ago,
she might experience a genuine emotion (because this emotion is about a
real person), but this experience won’t trigger any motivation (or at least
any behaviour), simply because there is nothing she can do. Thus, one could
argue that, even if we observed that (most) genuine emotions motivate us to
act while most fictional emotions do not motivate us to act, this would not
warrant concluding that these emotions are different: it might be that the
difference between real and fictional emotions corresponds to that between
real emotions towards objects we can act upon and real emotions towards
objects we cannot act upon – e.g. because they no longer exist. This is a
difference in our ability to act upon the objects of these emotions, rather than
a difference in their intrinsic motivational power.
A second difficulty is to determine which action tendencies are relevant.
Indeed, if one thinks about it, it seems obvious that fictional emotions can
motivate us to act in one way or another. For example, watching a horror
movie about scary vampires might motivate Sam to carefully close his door
and check whether there is no one lurking around his house. Or reading a
novel about the sufferings of (fictional) people in a third-world country might
prompt him to send money to NGOs. However, these (trivial) observations
have never been taken as definite proof that fictional emotions are genuine
emotions and not quasi-emotions. It is because not all motivating power will
do the trick. When quasi-emotions theorists argue that quasi-emotions lack
motivating power, they do not claim that quasi-emotions play no causal role in
our behaviour – an extremely implausible hypothesis. They claim something
more precise – maybe that quasi-emotions lack the action tendencies that are
characteristic of their genuine counterparts. For example, what distinguishes
genuine fear from quasi-fear is not that quasi-fear has no causal impact on
behaviour, but rather that quasi-fear lacks the action tendencies that are the
mark of genuine fear, that is: fleeing or running away. However, this means
that an experiment aiming at distinguishing genuine emotions from quasi-
emotions on the basis of their action tendencies presupposes a conceptual
inquiry into the relevant action tendencies. As long as this latter question is
not solved, any empirical attempt seems premature.
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However, assuming this second issue can be resolved (and there is no
reason to think that it cannot), there might be ways to bypass the first issue.
The first issue arises because, in most traditional fictions, we are unable to act
upon the fictional characters and situations. But not all forms of fictions allow
for the same degree of interaction: more and more, interactive fictions (such
as video-games) allow us to act within the fiction. Such fictions might thus
be a way to investigate whether fictional emotions lack motivational power,
though comparing them directly to genuine emotions with perfectly matched
experimental and control situations might prove difficult: indeed, as stressed
earlier, we cannot directly compare them with situations in which one directly
acts on the object of one’s emotion. Rather, we need to find an equivalent
in which participants have the possibility to act on a real object through a
representation of that object.68 One might for instance imagine something like
a virtual-reality game in which characters the participant interact with are
either completely fictional, or avatars from other players, and the participant
is then given the possibility to help one of these characters. However, as soon
as real players are involved, numerous ethical issues come into play.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, our goal was to survey empirical studies that seem relevant
to the philosophical debate on the paradox of fiction and the existence of
quasi-emotions, and to assess their relevance for this debate. Overall, our
assessment was quite negative. Not that these studies are methodologically
flawed (some are, but not all). The worry is rather that they focus on a
difference in intensity between real and fictional emotions that turns out to
be inconsequential for the philosophical debate. A more relevant empirical
test of the claim that fictional emotions are not genuine emotions should focus
on the action tendencies and motivational power of these emotions, although
several methodological issues stand in the way. For now, we can conclude that
experimental approaches have not contributed to solve the paradox of fiction,
which does not mean that they won’t be able to make decisive contributions
in the future.69
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6Cova and Teroni 2016.
7Cova and Teroni 2016.
8For a similar distinction, see Friend
2016; see also Langland-Hassan, forthcom-
ing, chap.11 for a discussion.
9Walton 1978, 6; see also 1990, 196.
As Stecker 2011, fn.2 observes, Walton
agrees we can feel emotions without be-
lieving anything – so, he does not en-
dorse (2) as such. But Walton does agree
that there is something paradoxical about
(quasi-)emotion for something we know
not to exist. And, as he notices Walton
1978, 8, these cases cannot be reconducted
to simple recalcitrant emotions. His quasi-
emotions solution can thus be considered
independently from the trilemma formula-
tion.
10Walton 1978, 6; 1990, 196.
11Walton 1978, 14;1990, chap.7;1997,
43-45.
12Currie 1990, 198.
13Currie 1990, §1.5; §2.4.
14For a discussion of Walton’s indirect
view, see Moran 1994 and Dorsch 2011.
15Currie 1990, 212.
16Currie and Ravenscroft 2002.
17Meinong 1902, 55 et seq. and Mulli-
gan 1999.




21Walton 1978, 7; see also Currie 1990,
200.
22Walton 1978, 13; 1990, 242.
23As pointed out by an anonymous ref-
eree, there might be exceptions to this
claim. We can find cases in which the
death of a fictional character can affect
us more deeply than the death of a real
person. However, it seems reasonable to
assume that (on average) the death of a
person we are attached to will affect us
more deeply and longer than the death of
a fictional character we are attached to. Of
course, it would be even better if we could
ground this assumption on empirical re-
sults, but we could not find any.
24In §4 we argue, against the empirical
literature, that quasi-emotions theories do
not imply or predict a difference in inten-
sity between emotions and quasi-emotions.
25Sperduti et al. 2016.
26Sperduti et al. 2016, 58.
27Pelletier 2018, 135.
28Given that philosophical discussions
have focused on phenomenology, one
might wonder how physiological responses
could be relevant to such debates. The
answer is that, though conceptually dis-
tinct from phenomenology, physiologi-
cal responses accompany emotional phe-
nomenology and their intensity can be con-
sidered a good proxy for the phenomeno-
logical intensity of affective responses.
It remains nevertheless possible to find
physiological changes without awareness.
Antonio Damasio is well known for hav-
ing argued that even though emotions are
brain and body modifications, most of
them are unconscious. (Damasio 1994,
chap.7). Conversely, some people argue
that emotions can be felt without a change




31LaMarre and Landreville 2009.
32Pouliot and Cowen 2007.
33Oliveira et al. 2009; Mocaiber et al.
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34Oliveira et al. 2009; see also Mocaiber
et al., 2011.
352009:871.
36This limitation extends to other stud-
ies not directly concerned with emotional
regulation (Mendelson and Papacharissi,
2007; Sperduti et al., 2017; Makowski et
al., 2019)
37Radford 1975:68-9
38To our knowledge, the only study that
escapes this difficulty is the one by Sper-
duti et al. (2016) that we mentioned in the
introduction.
39Sperduti et al. (2016)
40Sperduti et al. (2016), 57
412016: 58
42Sennwald et al. 2020
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43At the moment we are writing this
paper, these studies have not yet been
published. However, readers can find a
full description of studies and results on
the corresponding OSF registry: https:
//osf.io/vpzth/.
44Due to the short time it took partici-
pants to read the texts, it would have been
imprudent to analyse and draw conclu-
sions from the skin conductance data. In
the future, this limitation could be avoided
through the usage of longer texts and by
controlling for the participants’ reading
pace.
45Carroll 1995:95, our emphasis.
46Walton 1997:44
47Currie 1990:197-8
48Currie (1990:199; Walton (1990:251
49Hume, 1739/2007: II,1
50Mulligan 1999. See Arcangeli 2018:
117 et seq. for an illuminating discussion.
51Neill 1993. See also Kind 2017 for a
discussion of the elusive notion of vivid-
ness.
52Dorsch 2011:174. A referee pointed
out that lack of action tendency does not
prove that our feelings for fictions are M
quasi-emotions. Indeed, we could perfectly
endorse the view that we feel regular emo-
tions based on belief that p ‘in the fic-
tion’ which would also explain why we tend
to stay in the cinema even while we are




55Sperduti et al. 2016:54
56Davies 2009:270, our emphasis
57Neill 1993:5, our emphasis
58Wilde 1891/2007: 927
59We thank Stacie Friend for having
spelled this out to us.
60By contrast, if Sperduti et al. were
correct, we should rather endorse the
claim that (B’) Emotions towards charac-
ters/events known to be fictional are ce-
teris paribus equally intense as emotions
towards people/events known to be non-




64Deonna and Teroni 2012; Frijda 1986;
Scarantino 2014.
65Walton 1978:6
66Tullmann and Buckwalter 2014
67See for example Matravers 2014
68Against this methodological require-
ment, one might argue that, in interactive
fictions, people have the feeling of acting
directly on fictional entities themselves,
and not on a representation of these en-
tities. This is an interesting question that
deserves more theoretical and empirical re-
search - see Garcia 2012 for an approach
in terms of scope of the fictional operator.
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